For over a decade, the primary cause of Somalia’s absence of adequate political stability was pinpointed as insufficient institutional capacity and inadequate completion of state-building processes. Such explanations are no longer adequate.
State of law and order in Somalia’s case is no longer synonymously used. What describes the state of law and order in Somalia today is the fragmentation of Sovereignty.
Since the federation system was adopted, it has become the arena for contestation for legitimacy, ownership of territory, rights and powers under the Constitution, control of resources, and determination of the prevailing order. Fragmentation is being consciously and deliberately sustained through federalism.
The situation worsened considerably following the March 2024 constitutional amendments. Puntland’s suspension of recognition of the Federal Government plainly outlined the dissolution of Somali federalism. At the same time, Mogadishu and Jubaland intensified their unresolved issues of political control, elections, and security authority. These disputes no longer represent mere political disagreements. They are the foundational elements of Somalia’s security.
The reality that political fragmentation and security fragmentation are now the same is what makes the situation most perilous.
Throughout Somalia, the authority to provide security is highly fragmented, decentralized, and contested politically. Federal forces, regional security services, clan-aligned militias, intelligence structures, and foreign forces all operate under competing chains of command. Coordination is the result of temporary political compromises and not stable institutional systems.
This situation is operationally incoherent and is being exploited by insurgent forces such as Al-Shabaab.
The ongoing drawdown of ATMIS and the transition to AUSSOM are occurring amid an increasingly vulnerable security situation in Somalia. This transition is occurring during a time when Somalia lacks a fully integrated national security system.